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In Search of Passing Time 
It is a fortunate philosopher who has a good critic, someone who forces them to 
articulate tacit assumptions or to refine or even alter their views. I am a very fortunate 
philosopher, then, for I have two good critics, Oliver Pooley (2013) and Craig Callender 
(2017). What I will try to do in this talk is to respond as fully and cogently as I can to 
their criticism.

Let me add immediately that I agree with much that each of them has to say about 
time. I am here only trying to convince readers that there is more merit to the views I 
have espoused concerning the passage of time and the nature of the present than they 
might suppose, given the criticism of these views in Pooley’s paper and Callender’s 
book.

I

I begin from the fact that, broadly speaking, there are two views of time that vie for 
allegiance.  The first is manifest time, the time of our ordinary world view. We are 1
intimately familiar with it, yet find it hard to describe. One feature nearly universally 
ascribed to manifest time is that it has a kind of dynamic quality that space lacks. I 
acknowledge this feature by saying that time passes. Some say that time flows, but I 
think this is an unfortunate choice of words. Water flows, as in the age-old comparison 
of time to a river, but the water in a river flows by changing its spatial position with 
respect to time. Time cannot flow in this sense, since it cannot change its temporal 
position with respect to time, and usually no other sense is offered.

 As does Sellars (1963) and Callender (2017, chapter 1).1
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The second feature of manifest time is that it contains a present or now, and it is 
perfectly clear what this present is. It is a universe-wide (or global) hyperplane of 
simultaneous events, all the events that are happening now everywhere. The 
simultaneity relation uniquely partitions the universe of events into these hyperplanes, 
as far as common sense is concerned. 
2
These two features combine into a straightforward account of the nature of manifest 
passage: the passage of time is the successive occurrence of sets of simultaneous 
events. I argued in Savitt (2002) for this account by noting that both C. D. Broad (1938, 
his third and best account of time) and D. C. Williams (1951), in his classic dismissal 
criticism of passage, both agreed that passage in this sense existed.  I think that Henri 
Bergson also held this view. He wrote, quite pithily, that “time is succession” (2002, 
218). I think he felt that there was no need to state the (to him) obvious—that it is global 
nows that succeed one another.

There are two useful clarifications that I should make straightway. First of all, I want 
to remain neutral regarding the topology of time. I use the word ‘successive’ because I 
do not have a better one, but I do not wish to imply that a given now has an immediate 
successor or predecessor. Time might have a discrete topology, like the integers, but it 
might have a dense topology, like the real numbers. Discrete vs. dense is a broadly 
empirical matter on which I take no stand. 

Secondly, I do not wish my account of passage to commit me to a side in the 
venerable spacetime substantialism vs relationism dispute. My characterization of 
passage above has a relationist flavour, but I would be equally willing, if pressed, to 
state the view in a less catchy but more substantivalist way: the passage of time is that 
which makes possible the successive occurrence of sets of simultaneous events. For 
 A third basic feature of manifest time is that there is a radical difference between the past and the 2
future. I will have little to say about this feature in this paper. I will throughout suppose that spacetime is 
represented by an orientable manifold and that this manifold has, somehow, acquired an orientation.
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what it’s worth, I was raised in the substantivalist church, but I intend my remarks here 
to be neutral, even if some subconscious bias shows up in the phrasing.

Let me now turn to the criticism of these ideas in Pooley (2013). Pooley (quite 
correctly) lumps my view in with that of Dennis Dieks and Mauro Dorato and says :

their claim to have successfully identified temporal passage in the block 
universe risks diverting attention from the key challenge that the B theory 
faces, namely, that of providing a B-theoretic explanation of why we are 
inclined to take the ‘becoming more past’ of events as an objective feature 
of reality. (326)

There are, it seems to me, two ways to understand this sentence. First, Pooley may 
think that events do not objectively become more past. What is needed, then, is an 
account within the confines of the B-theory (as he understands it) of why we are 
inclined to fall into the error of thinking that they do.  But why should our view of 
passage, amongst all the various claims made in philosophy of time, or philosophy in 
general, or in any field in general, uniquely suffer from the “risk” of diverting attention 
from the (alleged) problem of providing an error theory for our inclination to believe that 
events become more past. No explanation is given.

Alternatively, Pooley may think that events do objectively become more past, but our 
account of passage is unable to underwrite a good explanation of this phenomenon. 
With that latter thought I straightforwardly disagree. Some events are past; and with 
the passage of time in our sense, they become more past. The event of Shania Twain’s 
birth, for instance, happened over fifty-two years ago.  If events continue to occur 3
successively, then in a few months, on August 28th, her birth will have occurred fifty-
three years ago. It will have become more past, and we all understand why. More time 
has passed since it occurred. 

 This was written in June, 2018.3
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Furthermore, this account is entirely compatible with Pooley’s own views. On his 
view (a view that I share with him and with Callender, I believe) indexicals do not 
describe, they locate. (Pooley, 2013, 324) ‘Here’ locates one in space, and ‘now’ 
locates one in time. So now Twain is at a certain temporal distance from her birth. I say: 
“Now Shania Twain is fifty-two. The event of her birth is past.”  Later, after more sets of 
simultaneous events have occurred,  she will be located temporally further from that 4
event. I can say then: “Now Shania Twain is fifty-three. The event of her birth is more 
past than it was when she was fifty-two.” All this seems perfectly objective (that is, not 
mind-dependent or subjective), though of course the exact nature of my statements 
and their truth conditions do depend on the existence of languages and systems of 
timekeeping and dating. 
5
Pooley, like John Earman, thinks this is all pretty boring—“thin and yawn-
inducing” (Pooley, 2013, 326) is their precise phrase. Let me say in response that if 
Pooley or Earman had said that my view was “contradiction-inducing” or “infinite-
regress inducing” or “circularity-inducing” or “the-end-of-physics-inducing”  (as has 6
been said of most, if not all, of the other, “thicker” accounts of passage on offer), I 
would be distraught. But “yawn-inducing” I can live with,  and even in part agree with. 7
 Ignoring, for the moment, relativistic complications. We will get to them soon enough.4
 In relativistic spacetimes the proper time interval between two events is path-dependent, so I and a 5
space-traveller may disagree as to the time interval between now and her next birthday. But once path is 
taken into account, objectivity is restored. There are further relativistic corrections that could be invoked, 
but they would leave the argument for objectivity unchanged.
 With this last phrase I have in mind the critique of branching spacetimes in Earman (2008). In particular, 6
as Figure 10.2 in that essay should make clear, a branching point creates a spacetime that is either not 
locally Euclidean (and so not apt for General Relativity, Earman’s Escape 5) or not Hausdorff (Earman’s 
Escape 6), with the attendant problems described in §3.4 of his paper. Unfortunately, Figure 10.2 is 
misprinted, obscuring the dilemma that threatens to undermine physics as we know it. In the (b) section 
of that Figure, the square and the round brackets should be interchanged and their directions adjusted 
accordingly.
 Perhaps Huggett (2014,12) expresses a similar attitude when he writes: “Almost everything that we 7
take for granted in formulating physical theories is at stake in a thickening of passage.” 
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What I have said so far is a bit boring, but I ask you to be patient. What I have said is 
only the first chapter in a story that eventually becomes head-scratch-inducing and 
amazement-inducing, not yawn-inducing, as you will see.

Let me end this section by quoting what seems to be a grudging admission by 
Pooley. “If,” he writes, “one wishes to label the successive occurrence of events 
‘temporal passage’ then, yes, time passes according to the B theory.” (326) But why 
not call the successive occurrence of events temporal passage? That’s what it is!  Isn’t 
that exactly what clocks measure (modulo my remarks above regarding relationalism 
and substantivalism)?

II

I began this paper by saying that there are two views of time that vie for our 
allegiance, but so far I have talked only about one of them, the manifest or 
commonsense view.  As an alternative to the manifest view, the scientific view of time  8
began to take shape in 1905 with Einstein’s special theory of relativity. It has grown and 
become strikingly more complex with the advent of the general theory of relativity, 
quantum theory and the various attempts to unite them into one picture in a quantum 
theory of gravitation. One can find a lot of this detail in the first half of Callender’s new 
book, but for my purpose it suffices to focus on one feature of the very first step into 
post-1905 time.

Einstein (1949, 61) wrote:

We now shall inquire into the insights of definite nature which physics owes 
to the special theory of relativity.

(1) There is no such thing as simultaneity of distant events… 

 For good reasons not to talk of “the” scientific view of time, see Rovelli (1995). I think that I can safely 8
ignore in this paper the excellent distinctions amongst scientific views of time that he makes there.
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A chain of disastrous conclusions seems to follow from Einstein’s observation. If 
there is no such thing as the simultaneity of distant events, then there are no global 
hyperplanes of simultaneous events. If global hyperplanes of simultaneous events are 
nows, then there are no nows. If passage is the successive occurrence of such nows, 
then there is no passage. Time in the post-1905 universe seems to be inert. The 
universe, it is said, is a “block universe”. Pre-1905 time has been shown to be, in 
Callender’s expression, “rubbish” (2017, 22).

But these conclusions, as straightforward as they are, contradict all our experience, 
not to mention clichés in every culture. What to do?

Callender, as did Sellars a generation ago, thinks that a reconciliation between these 
two competing views is necessary, and I agree. But a reconciliation between two 
parties requires an accurate understanding of each position. Part of the point of the 
boring stuff in section I is that manifest time has not been properly understood. If that’s 
true, then attempts at reconciliation will not lead to true reconciliation but to 
misbegotten ideas like “the block universe”. Let’s start afresh.

I suggest that we start from Bergson’s aphorism “Time is succession,” but in a 
post-1905 world we ask ourselves “Succession of what?” Some still want to give the 
same answer that Bergson would have given, a succession of global simultaneity 
slices. The search for these slices has not worked out well in post-1905 spacetimes.  9
In their absence one can embrace a block universe (whatever that might be) or take an 
instrumentalist or constructive empiricist approach to modern spacetime physics. One 
can do this, but is it not extremely puzzling, really, why the GPS works so well with 
relativistic corrections (and so how the Uber car manages to show up in response to a 
call)?

 See Callender (2017, chapters 2 and 3) for a catalog of failures. See Dieks (2006) for arguments that 9
such searches must fail in most spacetimes and that, even in the rare spacetimes in which they succeed, 
these global hypersurfaces have an arbitrary element and are irrelevant to our experience of time.
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I believe that in each of us (me too!) there is a deeply embedded picture of ourselves 
in a world (a whole or total world, a universe) unfolding in time moment by moment. In 
this picture all events (everywhere, anywhere) are totally ordered by a before (or after) 
relation.  It is this cherished picture that Einstein requires that we give up, but giving it 
up, difficult as that might be, has some upside; it opens a path to reconciliation. For if 
we focus on succession rather than on the global slices, we find that there is 
succession in relativistic spacetimes. It exists (or happens, or occurs) along timelike 
world lines. If we think locally (along timelike curves) rather than globally (across global 
hyperplanes), we can find in post-1905 spacetimes a successor to pre-1905 passage. 
The project of fashioning a coherent picture of time based on local passage to replace 
the familiar one that we must abandon is, if it is a valid project at all, a far from trivial 
one.

But now that we have identified a reasonable successor concept for the passage of 
time, we must ask whether we can find a viable successor concept to the pre-1905 
now or present? From one point of view, the answer is that it is surprisingly easy to find 
one. I noted in section I that Pooley and I (and Callender too) think of ‘now’ as an 
indexical that is used to locate the speaker (or writer) temporally. As long as there is 
time in post-1905 spacetimes, ‘now’ will continue to have the same use.

A reasonable philosopher might maintain that simply indicating the indexical use of 
‘now’ is all that one can or should say about the now, but a different reasonable 
philosopher might find this simple stance a cop out. In our pre-1905 way of thinking, 
the now is a region of spacetime—the hyperplane of events simultaneous with the 
utterance or inscription. Is there any any region of spacetime that can play a similar role 
in post-1905 spacetimes? 

As I have said, ‘now’ is used to locate one temporally, but “locating something 
temporally” is a vague or amorphous enterprise. If I say “I used to be able to swim a 
mile, but now I can’t,” that  ‘now’ indicates a period of fifteen years or perhaps even 
two decades, just as when I use ‘here’ I might mean this room or this city or this 
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country or this planet or… One has to acknowledge that there is an elastic or 
accordion-like quality to these two indexical expressions.

But one has also to acknowledge that there is in addition a “core” or very common 
use, at least of ‘now’. It’s that core use that made it plausible to identify the now as a 
particular set of simultaneous point events central to pre-1905 time and beloved of 
presentists. So our question becomes: Is there any similar way to identify a region of a 
relativistic spacetime as a region indicated or singled out by a “core” use of ‘now’?

One straightforward, natural, and even elegant suggestion along these lines is that 
of Stein (1968), Arthur (1982) and Dieks (1988, 2006). The present is just the spacetime 
point at which the utterance “It is now…” is made. The passage of time would then be 
a succession of points (or point events) along a timelike curve through that point. Ideal 
clocks measure proper time along timelike curves. Real clocks approximate the 
behaviour of ideal clocks. From this perspective it is natural to think of passage, if that 
is what is measured by ideal or real clocks, as a succession of points on such curves.

An unnatural or unintuitive feature of this proposal, if taken literally, is that none of us 
would share a  now or present. The timelike curve representing your life is entirely 
distinct from the timelike curve representing my life. This observation prompts a 
question: Is there a way that one might add (without going global again) a region, a 
hump or bump or limited lump of some kind, to a timelike curve to represent a region of 
spacetime that might be a reasonable location  picked out by a core use of  ‘now’?

In doing this one has to be a little careful. Pooley says that he seeks an A-theoretic 
view that “fully respects the symmetries of relativistic space-time.” (2013, 322) Stein 
(1968, 5) requires that structures in relativistic spacetimes be defined in terms of 
intrinsic features of the spacetime rather than “more or less arbitrary auxiliary 
constructs”. This is not the occasion on which to determine precisely what these 
restrictions come to,  but I do take them seriously. No arbitrary selection of a global 10
 See Clifton and Hogarth (1995) for a discussion.10
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hypersurface from amongst the usual infinity of global hypersurfaces will do by the 
Stein standard. No arbitrarily shaped bump on a worldline will do either.

But perhaps a bump defined in terms of causal or light-cone structure, in addition (of 
course) to the timelike worldline on which it is a bump, will do. That is a suggestion that 
I have made (Savitt, 2009) and that I still believe merits consideration. 

Think of the present not as an instant but as a “specious” present, a short time 
period in which we regard a set of events that happen sequentially (like the notes of a 
musical phrase) as happening now. The specious present varies in length from 
individual to individual and, for a given an individual, from time to time. Typical 
estimates of the length of specious presents range from .5 seconds to 3 seconds. 
Trying to take account fully of this variability would be very difficult and, I think, not very 
illuminating. So let me idealize a bit and assign to specious presents some arbitrary 
fixed duration of T seconds within the range of standard estimates. Then consider two 
points on a timelike curve 𝛾 that are T seconds of proper time apart. Call them e and e', 
with e the earlier of the pair. In any relativistic spacetime that is strongly causal there is 
a region defined as the intersection of the interior of the future light cone of e with the 
interior of the past light cone of e' called a causal diamond.  Here is a picture:
11
 See theorem 3.27 in Minguzzi and Sánchez (2008). In spacetimes that are not strongly causal one 11
must be doubly local. Each point in a relativistic spacetime is contained in an open set that, if taken as a 
spacetime in its own right, is globally hyperbolic (Wald, 1984, 263). The point is proved in Proposition 14 
in Krasnikov (2002), as John Manchak pointed out to me. In spacetimes that are not strongly causal, 
confine the discussion to the neighbourhoods U of that Proposition. See also Krasnikov’s Proposition 17, 
and for further philosophical discussion of causal diamonds, see Savitt (2015).
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My proposal is that properly scaled causal diamonds, those with proper time T from 
initial point to end point along a timelike curve 𝛾, are regions of spacetime that can 
serve as nows—that are regions of spacetime that can be thought of as the locations 
indicated by core uses of the indexical ‘now’. The passage of time is a succession of 
such causal diamonds (along a timelike curve). Time passes, of course, along every 
timelike curve. 
12
Craig Callender argues that attempts to find relativistic counterparts of manifest 
nows must fail. The more like the manifest now a proposal is, he says, the less 
relativistic it must be. The more relativistic it is, the less like the manifest now it must 
be. (2013, 31) While I admit that this dilemma has bite—and it does indeed bite several 
proposals that Callender reviews in chapters 2 and 3 of What Makes Time Special?—
 And would continue to pass even if, through some mischance, all sentient life on Earth were 12
annihilated in the next few years. This passage is not mind-dependent, and so is in that sense objective, 
as I insisted above.
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I’d like to try to defend my own proposal against his arguments. This defence may also 
help to clarify it.

Let me begin with a criticism of his that I think misses the mark just a bit. He says 
that “Savitt wishes to explain why human beings might come up with manifest time” 
and he rightly points out that causal diamonds play no causal role in explaining this 
peculiar bit of human conceptual development. But let me re-emphasize that what I 
wish to do is find a region of a relativistic spacetime that can play a role in our thinking 
about time that is something like, has some recognizable connection to, the late, 
lamented manifest now.

I’m afraid I muddied the waters a bit when I wrote the following about causal 
diamonds: “One reasonable demand on a scientific successor concept to a previous 
scientific concept or even to a folk concept is that it explains why the earlier concept is 
as useful or salient as it is.” (2009, 357) One reason Minkowski spacetime was readily 
accepted is that, at normal human speeds and scales, the region of points spacelike 
separated from a given point (a “doughnut” in Callender’s terms) looks like (or reduces 
to in the limit as velocity becomes infinite) a flat Newtonian hyperplane.   Similarly, a 
causal diamond that is, say, one second of proper time in temporal length is 300,000 
km wide at its waist. A causal diamond that is two seconds of proper time in temporal 
length is 600,000 km wide at its waist. Throughout history (until recently) such 
distances would be vast, and it would not be surprising if one thought them universe-
wide or global. It would be very hard to make the same case for points, or point-
events, by the way, a proposal of Howard Stein, Richard Arthur and Dennis Dieks (as 
noted above) that has influenced me greatly. I intended to make no proposal about 
human psychology or conceptual development beyond highlighting this particular 
advantage of diamonds over points.

Let’s look at some further complaints.
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By themselves, diamonds aren’t very promising manifest presents. They 
are local, [not] achronal, fail to bisect the world, and typically aren’t shared. 
One doesn’t find the global tripartite division of reality that is so central to 
the manifest image of time here. (Callender, 2017, 65)

At least, I think these were intended as complaints, but really they are just 
descriptions of my position. Three of them have the same content. Causal diamonds 
are local, and so they fail to bisect (into future and past regions) the world in the way a 
global hypersurface would, and so they do not provide a “tripartite division of reality” 
into past, future and present. And that’s all true. Causal diamonds are local structures, 
tied to timelike curves. They can’t divide all “reality” into past, present and future. The 
best they can provide is a partial ordering of events, but it seems to me that that is the 
most one can reasonably hope for (or demand) in relativistic spacetimes. 

Callender also points out that causal diamonds are not achronal. To say that a set of 
points is achronal is to say that no two points in the set are pairwise timelike separated. 
The set may form a wavy surface, but there is a limit to the waviness, and the set is 
thin. In a paper I wrote long ago (Savitt, 2000) I took it as a condition of adequacy for 
any region of a relativistic spacetime to be a successor present that it be achronal, like 
the manifest present. And then I proved to my satisfaction, and perhaps to the 
satisfaction of some others, that no achronal region could be a decent successor to the 
manifest now.

But after a few years I began to feel I had been a bit cavalier. I don’t understand it 
and I may not know how to describe it exactly, but experience persistently tells me that 
there is such a thing as the specious present, a period of time in which successive 
events all seem present or to be happening now (but not simultaneously). Such a thick 
set of events cannot be achronal. The set of events on some timelike curve (like my 
worldline) are by definition timelike related. So silly as it may seem, it looks as though 
two events e and e' can both be happening now (in the sense of being in the same 
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specious present)  even if e' happens after e (where this is not a frame-dependent but 
an invariant relation). If specious presents can be presents though achronal, then being 
achronal can’t be a necessary condition for being a present. I concluded that my old 
argument had been good as far as it went, but that it did not go far enough because it 
restricted without sufficient warrant the set of possible presents to thin surfaces, as 
opposed to thick ones.  
13
It is true that failing to be achronal is a way that causal diamonds differ from 
manifest presents. I can no longer argue, as I was once inclined to, that failing to be 
achronal disqualifies causal diamonds from being possible successor relativistic 
presents. I hope no one else can make that argument now either.

Callender also says that causal diamonds fall short as presents because they are not 
shared. In this charge I think he holds me to a stricter standard than he holds himself. It 
is true that diamonds anchored on two different world lines, even if they are of the 
same proper time T in temporal length, will not completely overlap. In that sense, they 
will not be “shared.” 

But they can almost completely overlap (if the world lines and the beginning and end 
points of the diamonds are close), so it seems fair to say that for all practical purposes 
they do sometimes overlap. In that satisficing sense two diamonds can be and are 
sometimes shared. 

This satisficing sense, moreover, is one that Callender avails himself of in a 
discussion of “now patches”.  A now patch is “a spatiotemporal region over which 
typical observers in a typical environment do not require a time stamp in order to 
reliably navigate their environments.” (216) If we are not far apart and we speak of 
similar times, then your now patch and mine are likely to be extremely similar, though 
 Reminder: this current use of thin v thick contrasts achronal with non-achronal sets. My contrast of 13
thin v thick earlier contrasted my deflated or minimalist account of passage as succession with other 
allegedly “richer” accounts.
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not strictly identical. These now patches are then “sewn together” into a global 
common now. “If I snap my fingers and say ‘right now!’ this picks out the same coarse-
grained moment for everyone in the room.” But if Callender snaps his fingers and says 
‘right now!’, he is saying it right now as far as both his and my diamond present are 
concerned too. Why can’t I take advantage of a similar coarse-graining and say that 
our causal diamond present is shared?

Callender also writes that diamond presents are not good candidates for the kind of 
“ontological priority” required of the present. (Callender, 2017, 66) I am not quite certain 
what he means by this, since I am not sure what ‘ontologically prior’ means in this 
context aside from temporally immediate—that is, present as opposed to past or 
future. In that trivial sense, the present is of course ontologically prior. 

But if the present needs to be ontologically prior or ontologically distinguished in any 
stronger sense, then that stronger sense needs to be spelled out clearly. Savitt (2006) 
can be read as arguing that there is no non-trivial sense in which the manifest present 
is “ontologically prior”. I am therefore, untroubled by the claim that my relativistic 
successor presents, causal diamonds, are not good candidates for ontological priority 
either. If others think I should be troubled, I invite them to spell out what the trouble is.

In addition to all these supposed problems with my proposal noted above Callender 
thinks that the motivation for it is confused. “Diamond presents seem to be a kind of 
unstable attempt to satisfy two masters, relativity and psychology.” (2917, 65) Leaving 
aside stability for the moment, I want to plead guilty to, and even to double down on, 
this charge. Not only do I see myself as serving two masters, but as serving two pairs 
of two masters! 

The first pair I have already discussed at length—the manifest and the relativistic 
views of time. I have argued that what is viable in the manifest view, what can survive 
the relativistic revolution in time, is local succession, and I have proposed causal 
diamonds as clean relativistic local structures that can be arranged successively along 
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timelike curves. To reconcile the competing claims of these two conceptions of time, a 
goal that Callender, like me, professes to be pursuing, is to serve two masters.

The other pair of masters is the one that Callender indicates, relativity and 
psychology. Many years ago I was asked to contribute an essay on Abner Shimony’s 
view of time for a Festschrift in his honour. (Savitt, 2009) In his famous paper on time 
called ‘The Transient now’ Shimony proposed a goal for a naturalist realist 
metaphysics, the goal of “closing the circle.”

The program [of closing the circle] envisages the identification of the 
knowing subject (or, more generally, the experiencing subject) with a natural 
system that interacts with other natural systems. In other words, the 
program regards the first person and an appropriate third person as the 
same entity. From the subjective standpoint the knowing subject is at the 
center of the cognitive universe, and from the objective standpoint it is an 
unimportant system in a corner of the universe. (1993, 40)

In trying to understand the import of this program for understanding time, I devised 
the following slogan:

Philosophy of time should aim at an integrated picture of the experiencing 
subject with its felt time in an experienced universe with its spatiotemporal 
structure. (2009, 351)

Callender fulfills part of this program by carefully reviewing the current literature on 
our construction, mostly via unconscious processes, of the subjective present from the 
mass of sensory inputs. These signals come from different directions, affect different 
sensory systems, take different times to arrive at the central nervous system and to 
process, yet somehow out of these messy materials we construct a unified subjective 
present. I understand a present patch to be a region of spacetime that more-or-less 
corresponds to the content of these subjective presents. So Callender moves along the 
circumference of the circle (if I may continue Shimony’s image) from the subjective to 
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the spatiotemporal, though present patches—the objective correlates of the 
constructed, felt present—seem bound to be messy and shifting regions of spacetime. 

My suggestion, then, amounts to the proposal that we move just a little bit further 
along the circle—that we make present patches relativistically acceptable by 
smoothing them into diamonds. We know that diamonds, in strongly causal 
spacetimes, can form a topology for the whole spacetime. Of course, this comes 
nowhere near closing the circle. It’s just a tiny step. We are just beginning to explore 
the global structure of spacetime. And locally we need a much fuller picture of the 
interaction of the environment (the ambient bit of spacetime and matter) with our 
sensory systems, the functioning of the sensory systems and central nervous system, 
and the mysterious gap between neural activity and consciousness.  But every little 
connection, if it’s a step in the right direction, helps.

Is my proposal unstable? I think not, but I have no more proof of this than Callender 
has of the opposite. I think he sees two pairs of vectors representing conceptual 
“forces”, each pair pointed in opposite directions, pointing away from causal 
diamonds, tugging them in different directions. Hence instability. Here’s a picture: 
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I see the same two pairs of vectors but both pairs pointed towards the one point, the  
one way to balance all these conceptual forces, the stable causal diamond present.

Let me add that, while I propose and defend them, I cannot prove that causal 
diamonds provide the unique best solution to the problem of finding a present in 
relativistic spacetimes. There may be other ways of looking at passage and, just as 
there are those who prefer moissanite to diamond, other kinds of present might seem 
attractive to others. The one thing I do feel confident about is that, after Einstein, the 
resulting present will be local.

Conclusion

As Bergson said: Time is succession. I suspect that Bergson felt able to express this 
thought so succinctly because he had no doubt about what succeeded what. Global 
simultaneity slices. Many still think that way. But this view is difficult, and perhaps 
impossible, to maintain post-1905.
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There is no need to maintain it. Drop globality, I say, but retain succession. One then 
has passage, but as a local phenomenon along timelike curves, where proper time and 
the clocks that measure it live. Trying to form a picture of time this way is not at all a 
yawn-inducing exercise. It is puzzling and difficult when one tries to picture a world of 
local times, but it is well worth a try. 
14
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